The NYT features a profile of Glenn Hubbard, “Romeney’s Go-To Economist.”
Hubbard is still dean of the Columbia
business school, and can well become Secretary of the Treasury if Romney
somehow sails into the White House. Once there, he would likely seek to revive
George W. Bush’s economic policy, i.e., return the US to the economic course which once
led it to the precipice. Otherwise, Hubbard looks like another nerdy libertarian
economist who passes for a “conservative,” American-style. He has not shrunk
from raking in millions from industries whose practices he has justified in
academic papers and articles; and from corporations and executives accused of fraudulent
behavior, in whose defense he has readily provided “expert” testimony.
This is all highlighted in the NYT article, with some colleagues calling
Hubbard a “mercenary” and describing his managerial style as “Brezhnevian.” I
have a sense, though, that this new attempt at character assassination won’t
fair much better than the previous one, by the makers of Inside Job (which is also
mentioned in the article). I guess Professor Hubbard has only one eventuality
to worry about – the likelihood that, after all this worldly success, he may at
some point burn in hell.
Meanwhile, there is a different word of caution coming from Cynthia
Freeland on the op-ed pages of the NYT. She has chronicled the rise of the “new
global elite” (dubbed the “cognitive elite” by the Economist staff) in a
popular article in the Atlantic , and in a
subsequent book. She now argues, on the basis of some historical analogies,
that “the 1 percent” are pursuing a policy of “self-destruction” by gobbling a
disproportionate amount of the country’s GDP; and by making sure that only
their kids receive the extreme academic preparation needed for entry into the Ivy
League schools (or smuggling them in as “legacies” when they still fail to
shine). Of course, Hubbard and his likes (on both sides of the political divide)
would respond that the strategies which appall Freeland are just normal human
responses to a particular incentive structure; and they have little use for
historical analogy.